Wednesday, September 09, 2009
American Prominence: pt.6
The United States was far from universally loved under President George W. Bush. Many foreigners saw it as taking advantage of the "unipolar movement" by going to war twice and denying a slew of international agreements and institutions, from the Kyoto Protocol to the International Criminal Court. The United States' autonomy, ran the message of Gulliver Unbound, was not going to be curbed or controlled by the world at large. And yet, for all the anti-Americanism that has coursed though Western Europe, the Islamic world, and Latin America in recent years, the United States has remained the world's dominant power. When it adopted a hands-off policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early years of the Bush Administration, no other state could fill the vacuum. And when it decided to reengage in the peace process in Annapolis 2007, everybody showed up; no other government could have mustered that much convening power. Nor could any other nation have harnessed the global coalition that has been fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. The six-party talks with North Korea were orchestrated by the United States; on the other hand, the three-party talks with Iran- led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom- could not put a stop to Iran's nuclear ambitions. The moral is that either the United States takes care of the heavy lifting or nobody does. And this is the concise definition of a default power.
Nor can the rest truly constrain U.S. might. France, Germany, and Russia tried to do so in the run-up to the second Iraq war, in 2003, but ultimately could not stop the U.S. behemoth. In a grudging homage to U.S. power, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder helped the war effort by granting the United States basing and overflight rights and agreeing to guard U.S. installations in the country to free up U.S. forces for duty in Iraq. More recently, in 2008, it was the United Kingdom and the United States- rather than the G-20- that took the lead in battling the global financial crisis, with massive stimulus measures and injections of liquidity. The speed with which Barack Obama captured the hearts and minds around the world after his election in November 2008 represented a rare moment in the annals of the great powers- a moment of relief at having a U.S. president who made it possible for the world to love his country again.
Of course, the United States will not get its way always or everywhere, nor will worldwide affection for Obama translate into a surfeit of U.S. influence. The default power is still an unberpower, and other states will seek to balance it. China and Russia, for example, protect Iran and North Korea from painful UN sanctions. Meanwhile, China and the United States hold each other hostage in a state of M-MAD, or "monetary mutual assured destruction." China cannot unload hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of U.S. Treasury bills without destroying the dollar and its trade surplus which created its hoard in the first place. Nor can Washington force Beijing to give up on its predatory trade and exchange-rate policies without suffering monetary retaliation.
But financial deterrence does not a new default power make. The economic storm that hit the Untied States in 2008 has triggered a tsunami in China, which has cut its growth rate in half- although six percent is still a lot better than the negative growth rate suffered by much of the West. And like the world's other aspiring powers, China lacks the legitimacy that transforms muscle into leadership. The Obama administration grasps this enduring essence of world politics- it adds kindness to clout, amicability to hard assets.
Take Obama's overtures to the Muslim world, outlined first in his inaugural address and then more fully in his speech in Cairo in June. Prince Obama needs no advice from Machiavelli, who famously counseled that it is best to be both loved and feared. By flattering the Islamic world and widening the distance between Israel and the United States, the Obama administration hopes to improve its chances of forging a Sunni Arab alliance against Iran. Forgoing the use of force against Iran's and North Korea's nuclear armaments may be more than just an act of prudence, especially when the costs of war- say, retaliation by Iran against tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf or a North Korean attack on South Korea- loom larger than the risks of proliferation down the road. What cannot be averted might just as well be turned into a diplomatic advantage. Tehran's and Pyongyang's unchecked nuclear ambitions may well facilitate a U.S.-led coalition building against them. A default power always gains stature when the demand for its services soars.
The default power does what others cannot or will not do. It underwrites Europe's security against a resurgent Russia- which is why U.S. troops remain welcome there even after 20 years after Moscow's capitulation in the Cold War. It helps the Europeans take care of local malefactors, such as former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. It chastises whoever reaches for mastery over the Middle East, thus the United States helped Iraq in its war against Iran between 1980 and 1988 and then defanged it in 1991 and again in 2003. Only the default power has the power to harness a coalition against Iran, the new pretender in the Middle East. It guarantees the survival of Israel, but at the same time, the Palestinians and the Saudis look to the United States for leverage against Jerusalem. Is it possible to imagine China, Europe, or Russia as a more persuasive mediator? No, because only the United States can insure both the Arabs and the Israelis against the consequences of misplaced credulity.
In the new Great Game, the United States offers itself as a silent partner against the Russian attempts to restore sway over its former satrapies, and it leads the renewed battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, signaling ever so softly that it will sequester Pakistan's nuclear weapons in chaos widens into collapse. At the same time, only the United States can rein in both India and Pakistan and protect each other against each other. The United States has drawn India into its orbit, and in doing so it has added to the informal balance against China. Dreams of Asia Rising must pay respect to the strategic reality centered on the United States as the underwriter of regional security. Whether Vietnam or Japan, South Korea or Australia- all of Asia counts of the United States to keep China on its best behavior and Japan from going nuclear.
Gainsayers will still dramatize China's growth rates as a harbinger of a grand power shift. The facts and figures and the story of the resistible rise of previous contenders should give pause to those who either cheer or fear the United States abdication. Linearity is not a good predictor. Imperial powers have regularly succumbed to the ebb and flow of power, although in the United Kingdom's case, that took 300 years. How long will the United States' luck last?Addicted to constant reinvention, it should not fall prey to the rigor mortis that overwhelmed the Ottoman, Austrian, Russian, and Soviet empires.
As the twenty-first century unfolds, the United States will be younger, and more dynamic than its competitors. And as a liberal empire, it can work the international system with fewer costs than yesterday's behemoths, which depended on territorial possessions and had to conduct endless wars against natives and rivals. A Tyrannosaurus Rex faces costlier resistance than the bumbling bull that is the United States. A final point to ponder: Who would actually want to live in a world dominated by China, India, Japan, Russia, or even Europe, which for all its enormous appeal cannot take care of its own backyard? Not even those who have been trading in glee and gloom decade after decade would prefer any of them to take over as housekeeper of the world.
Nor can the rest truly constrain U.S. might. France, Germany, and Russia tried to do so in the run-up to the second Iraq war, in 2003, but ultimately could not stop the U.S. behemoth. In a grudging homage to U.S. power, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder helped the war effort by granting the United States basing and overflight rights and agreeing to guard U.S. installations in the country to free up U.S. forces for duty in Iraq. More recently, in 2008, it was the United Kingdom and the United States- rather than the G-20- that took the lead in battling the global financial crisis, with massive stimulus measures and injections of liquidity. The speed with which Barack Obama captured the hearts and minds around the world after his election in November 2008 represented a rare moment in the annals of the great powers- a moment of relief at having a U.S. president who made it possible for the world to love his country again.
Of course, the United States will not get its way always or everywhere, nor will worldwide affection for Obama translate into a surfeit of U.S. influence. The default power is still an unberpower, and other states will seek to balance it. China and Russia, for example, protect Iran and North Korea from painful UN sanctions. Meanwhile, China and the United States hold each other hostage in a state of M-MAD, or "monetary mutual assured destruction." China cannot unload hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of U.S. Treasury bills without destroying the dollar and its trade surplus which created its hoard in the first place. Nor can Washington force Beijing to give up on its predatory trade and exchange-rate policies without suffering monetary retaliation.
But financial deterrence does not a new default power make. The economic storm that hit the Untied States in 2008 has triggered a tsunami in China, which has cut its growth rate in half- although six percent is still a lot better than the negative growth rate suffered by much of the West. And like the world's other aspiring powers, China lacks the legitimacy that transforms muscle into leadership. The Obama administration grasps this enduring essence of world politics- it adds kindness to clout, amicability to hard assets.
Take Obama's overtures to the Muslim world, outlined first in his inaugural address and then more fully in his speech in Cairo in June. Prince Obama needs no advice from Machiavelli, who famously counseled that it is best to be both loved and feared. By flattering the Islamic world and widening the distance between Israel and the United States, the Obama administration hopes to improve its chances of forging a Sunni Arab alliance against Iran. Forgoing the use of force against Iran's and North Korea's nuclear armaments may be more than just an act of prudence, especially when the costs of war- say, retaliation by Iran against tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf or a North Korean attack on South Korea- loom larger than the risks of proliferation down the road. What cannot be averted might just as well be turned into a diplomatic advantage. Tehran's and Pyongyang's unchecked nuclear ambitions may well facilitate a U.S.-led coalition building against them. A default power always gains stature when the demand for its services soars.
The default power does what others cannot or will not do. It underwrites Europe's security against a resurgent Russia- which is why U.S. troops remain welcome there even after 20 years after Moscow's capitulation in the Cold War. It helps the Europeans take care of local malefactors, such as former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. It chastises whoever reaches for mastery over the Middle East, thus the United States helped Iraq in its war against Iran between 1980 and 1988 and then defanged it in 1991 and again in 2003. Only the default power has the power to harness a coalition against Iran, the new pretender in the Middle East. It guarantees the survival of Israel, but at the same time, the Palestinians and the Saudis look to the United States for leverage against Jerusalem. Is it possible to imagine China, Europe, or Russia as a more persuasive mediator? No, because only the United States can insure both the Arabs and the Israelis against the consequences of misplaced credulity.
In the new Great Game, the United States offers itself as a silent partner against the Russian attempts to restore sway over its former satrapies, and it leads the renewed battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, signaling ever so softly that it will sequester Pakistan's nuclear weapons in chaos widens into collapse. At the same time, only the United States can rein in both India and Pakistan and protect each other against each other. The United States has drawn India into its orbit, and in doing so it has added to the informal balance against China. Dreams of Asia Rising must pay respect to the strategic reality centered on the United States as the underwriter of regional security. Whether Vietnam or Japan, South Korea or Australia- all of Asia counts of the United States to keep China on its best behavior and Japan from going nuclear.
Gainsayers will still dramatize China's growth rates as a harbinger of a grand power shift. The facts and figures and the story of the resistible rise of previous contenders should give pause to those who either cheer or fear the United States abdication. Linearity is not a good predictor. Imperial powers have regularly succumbed to the ebb and flow of power, although in the United Kingdom's case, that took 300 years. How long will the United States' luck last?Addicted to constant reinvention, it should not fall prey to the rigor mortis that overwhelmed the Ottoman, Austrian, Russian, and Soviet empires.
As the twenty-first century unfolds, the United States will be younger, and more dynamic than its competitors. And as a liberal empire, it can work the international system with fewer costs than yesterday's behemoths, which depended on territorial possessions and had to conduct endless wars against natives and rivals. A Tyrannosaurus Rex faces costlier resistance than the bumbling bull that is the United States. A final point to ponder: Who would actually want to live in a world dominated by China, India, Japan, Russia, or even Europe, which for all its enormous appeal cannot take care of its own backyard? Not even those who have been trading in glee and gloom decade after decade would prefer any of them to take over as housekeeper of the world.
